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DEIRDRE NANSEN MCCLOSKEY (Michigan, 1942) is Distinguished Profes-
sor Emerita of Economics and of History, and Professor Emerita of English 
and of Communication, at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Trained at 
Harvard in the 1960s as an economist, she has written twenty-five 
books and some four hundred academic articles on economic theory, po-
litical theory, economic history, philosophy, rhetoric, statistical theory, 
feminism, ethics, and law. 
She taught for twelve years at the University of Chicago in the Eco-
nomics Department in its glory days, but now describes herself as a “lit-
erary, quantitative, postmodern, free-market, progressive-Episcopalian, 
ex-Marxist, Midwestern woman from Boston who was once a man. Not 
‘conservative’! I’m a Christian classical liberal” (McCloskey, n. d.). 
Her most recent popular books, for example, are Why Liberalism 
Works: How True Liberal Values Produce a Freer, More Equal, Prosperous 
World for All (2019a); with Art Carden, Leave Me Alone and I’ll Make You 
Rich: How the Bourgeois Deal Enriched the World (2020); and, with Alberto 
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Mingardi, The Myth of the Entrepreneurial State (2020). Also, in 2019, the 
University of Chicago Press published a third edition of her classic man-
ual on style, Economical Writing (2019b), and a twentieth-anniversary re-
issue of Crossing: A Transgender Memoir ([1999] 2019c), with a new Af-
terword. She’s technical and quantitative, too. For example, with Stephen 
Ziliak, in 2008, she wrote The Cult of Statistical Significance, widely 
praised, which shows that null hypothesis tests of ‘significance’ are, in 
the absence of a substantive loss function, meaningless. The point, made 
long before McCloskey by a few statisticians, is becoming widely accepted, 
for example, in the American Statistical Association, though not yet in 
economics and medicine. 
Her latest scholarly book, again from the University of Chicago 
Press, Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched 
the World (2016b), was the final volume of the Bourgeois Era trilogy (2006, 
2010, 2016b). It argues for an ‘ideational’ explanation of the Great Enrich-
ment of 3,000 percent per person from 1800 to the present in places like 
Britain, and Japan, and Finland. The accidents of Reformation and Revolt 
in northwestern Europe, during 1517–1789, led to a new liberty and dig-
nity for commoners—ideas called ‘liberalism’ in the proper sense—which 
led in turn to an explosion of commercially tested betterment, ‘having a 
go’. The second book in the trilogy, Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics 
Can’t Explain the Modern World (2010), had shown that materialist expla-
nations such as saving or exploitation, don’t have enough economic 
oomph or historical relevance to explain the Enrichment. The alleged ex-
planations that do not focus on the new ideology of innovism—her name 
for the ill-named ‘capitalism’—are mistaken. And the Enrichment did not 
corrupt our immortal souls. The inaugural book in the trilogy, The Bour-
geois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce (2006), had established that, 
contrary to the clamor since 1848 by the clerisy left and right, the bour-
geoisie is pretty good, and that commercially tested betterment is not the 
worst of ethical schools. In short, the trilogy looks forward, if populism 
does not spoil the prospect, to a world of universal dignity and prosperity 
created by liberal innovism. 
 
Paolo Silvestri interviews Deirdre McCloskey on the occasion of her latest 
book, Bettering Humanomics: A New, and Old, Approach to Economic Sci-
ence (2021a). The interview covers her personal and intellectual life, the 
main turning points of her journey and her contributions. More specifi-
cally, the conversation focuses on McCloskey’s writings on the methodology 
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and rhetoric of economics, her interdisciplinary ventures into the humanities, 
the Bourgeois Era trilogy with its history of the ‘Great Enrichment’, her liberal 
political commitments, and the value and meaning of liberty, equality, and 
solidarity. Finally, the conversation returns to McCloskey’s ‘humanomics’ ap-
proach: an economics with the humans left in. 
 
 
PAOLO SILVESTRI: You have described yourself as a “literary, quanti-
tative, postmodern, free-market, progressive-Episcopalian, ex-Marxist, 
Midwestern woman from Boston who was once a man. Not ‘conserva-
tive’! I’m a Christian classical liberal” (McCloskey, n. d.). It seems to me 
that this description may be a pivot around which our conversation can 
rotate. More exactly, I would like to develop the questions of this inter-
view through a game of ‘cross-references’ between your career, per-
sonal and professional, the main turning points of your intellectual life, 
and what you have achieved with your publications. 
Let’s start with your ‘Humanomics project’, and the (just published) 
book, Bettering Humanomics: A New, and Old, Approach to Economic 
Science (McCloskey 2021a).1 Can we say that the Humanomics project 
has been, without you quite knowing it, your life-long project and 
achievement? 
DEIRDRE NANSEN MCCLOSKEY: Yes. I only realized in the past couple of 
years that humanomics is what I have been struggling to say from class 
poet in secondary school to old-lady economist. That’s sixty years to get 
the point. I am not the swiftest of thinkers! Economists like Arjo Klamer 
(as in Klamer 2017 and earlier writings), and Don Lavoie (1985), and Al-
bert Hirschman (1977), and Kenneth Boulding (1956), and of course the 
Blessed Adam Smith, did humanomics well before letter. As I say in a 
forthcoming intellectual autobiography:  
 
It’s an advantage in having an intellectual development to be a little 
stupid, or at best earnestly naïve, as on both counts I am. Natural 
economists—natural because their personalities make it a snap for 
them to grasp how a maximizing person would behave—find it hard 
to develop. They are too smart at the outset. They get it immediately, 
 
1 I (Paolo) had the pleasure and honor of following and previewing this book when it was 
still in its ‘embryonic’ state, that is, before the embryo split in two, generating its twin 
brother, Beyond Behaviorism, Positivism, and Neo-Institutionalism in Economics (McClos-
key, forthcoming(c)). We held another, and more specific, conversation about this book 
in McCloskey and Silvestri (2021). 
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and then keep it, forever.2 On the contrary, I am not a natural econo-
mist. It was hard for me to learn economics of the Samuelsonian and 
Friedmanite and Koopmanslijk sort. It didn’t fit my personality or eth-
ical upbringing. But I declare on oath here that at each stage of learn-
ing, from child to old lady, I was stupidly, naïvely sincere, believing 
earnestly in each of the half-truths grasped along the way. Really. 
My little witticisms, to which I am addicted, give people sometimes 
the opposite impression, of an insincere ironist of the sort the great 
Joseph Schumpeter was. He was unable to quite let go of his early (and 
sound) understanding of markets, or then of his youthful (if dispro-
portionate) admiration for a Marxian sociology, or then of his mature 
(if premature) findings on economic and intellectual history, all of 
them busily making ironic little jokes about each other throughout his 
book of 1942, Socialism, Capitalism, and Democracy.3 In my case, no, 
believe me: I am a serial believer. Contradictory as are the successive 
economic opinions I have held, I was stupidly loyal to each. (McClos-
key, forthcoming(a)) 
 
So I had to trudge slowly, slowly through nearly every rhetorical and epis-
temological position relevant to economics one could imagine, from pos-
itivism to postmodernism, until, as I now suppose, I got it approximately 
right. The purpose of humanomics is to gather all the evidence—counts 
and categories, both. You can’t count until you know through humanistic, 
rhetorical, ethical, philosophical inquiry what the justified and humanly 
interesting categories are. It is one reason for the unique program in the 
Department of Philosophy at Erasmus University, in which I taught for 
many years, the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE). 
Get the categories straight, if you don’t want to look like a fool when you 
turn to counting. Count national income, to be sure—but which definition 
of the nation, or of income? French overseas possessions? Diasporas? 
Housewives’ work? Environment? As grown-up economic scientists, we 
need to use all the evidence—experimental, simulative, introspective, 
questionnaire, graphical, categorical, statistical, literary, gossipy, histori-
cal, journalistic, psychological, sociological, political, theological, ethical. 
Get the numbers right and the qualities to be numbered. 
 
Let’s go back, then, to the origins. In the preface to Bettering Humanom-
ics, you trace the origins of that work to turning points in your career, 
in particular, the books The Rhetoric of Economics ([1985] 1998), If 
You’re So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise (1990), and 
 
2 See McCloskey (1992). 
3 See Schumpeter ([1942] 1950) and McCloskey (forthcoming(b)). 
DEIRDRE NANSEN MCCLOSKEY / INTERVIEW 
VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, SPRING 2021 186 
Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics (1994). I think this particular 
turning point, among many in your life, was a big leap forward—con-
sidering your conventional training at Harvard, then your conven-
tional university career getting tenure at Chicago. What caused this 
‘linguistic turn’ in your intellectual journey? (I use the expression ‘lin-
guistic turn’ not by chance, given your relationship with Richard Rorty 
and his first wife, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, from whom you got your 
often repeated motto ‘listen, really listen to your friends’ questions and 
objections’.) 
Our lives depend on tiny incidents, don’t they? Whom you marry, what 
you do, books you read, incidental encounters. Of course, the incidents 
have their effect on a person or a people who are prepared in some way. 
Having learned by age 37 how to be a conventional economist, I was by 
then thoroughly irritated by the method-talk of both my Harvard teachers 
and my Chicago colleagues, each claiming the white coat of Science and 
sneering at the other place. Both the Harvardian talk about realism and 
imperfections and the Chicagoan talk about as-if and the evidence ‘con-
sistent with’ a favored hypothesis seemed silly, even childish.  
The causal incident, si non non, was an invitation, during what became 
my last year of twelve at Chicago in the fall of 1979, by the literary critic 
Wayne Booth—because I suppose of a not altogether justified reputation 
for being less barbarous than the other economists—to speak to his un-
dergraduate program on Politics, Philosophy, and Economics on ‘the rhet-
oric of economics’. As I narrate this episode in the autobiography, “I said, 
‘Sure, Wayne. But what’s that?’ Oh. He gave me a short reading list, which 
I crammed during a visit to my father-in-law’s house in Vermont over 
Christmas of 1979, and gave the talk early in 1980” (McCloskey, forth-
coming(a)). Chicago in spring that year refused to promote me to full pro-
fessor—‘Wait’, they said—and I realized with a jolt that they viewed me 
as one of the Help. The Barons at Chicago had or were going to have No-
bels. Becker, Lucas, Mundell, Heckman. The Help did the work. Harry and 
Gale Johnson, Gregg Lewis, . . . McCloskey. Oh, no, I said, and decamped 
to the University of Iowa. There and on long visits to the Australian Na-
tional University in Canberra and at the Institute for Advanced Study at 
Princeton, I laboriously, with a great deal of reading such as Dick Rorty’s 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), revised and extended the talk 
to Wayne’s class into the 1983 article on the rhetoric of economics, and 
then the book ([1985] 1998). 
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It makes much more sense to view science as rhetoric, that is, as hu-
man persuasion, than as an exercise in epistemology. You see it better. I 
eventually escaped entirely from the ghost of logical positivism which to 
this day haunts so many philosophers of economics, and drives the actual 
economists insane. The three books you mention were the fruit of that in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Rhetoric said that economists were poets, us-
ing metaphors, that is, models. If You’re So Smart noted that they were 
novelists, writing stories—out of a continuum in the human mind having 
metaphors at one end and metonymies at the other. Knowledge then de-
fended these obvious assertions from the indignation of economists and 
their philosophers at being called poets and novelists. They seemed to 
worry that admitting that they thought and persuaded like other human 
beings would make them non-Scientists. Yet all scientists use metaphors 
and stories, such as quantum mechanics and evolution by natural selec-
tion. Meanwhile, I kept up my scientific work on historical topics such as 
the gold standard and English agricultural history. I have always wanted 
to be chiefly an economic and historical scientist. But I kept being dragged 
back into methodology by the evident insanity of my beloved colleagues 
in economics. I felt it was my duty to try out the clinical psychologist’s 
talking cure on them, to save the poor dears from the results of their 
insanity, such as tests of statistical ‘significance’ and the proliferation of 
imagined ‘imperfections in the market’ based on no scientific evidence. 
 
Whom do you consider among your masters, and who are the scholars 
who most influenced you in that first decade or so of the post-Chicago 
period? 
There were a great many, most of them humanists of one sort or another. 
I was trying to add a serious understanding of the humanities to my un-
derstanding of social science, and took, for example, courses in Latin, 
Greek, and Italian for the purpose, and co-taught courses at Iowa with 
rigorous professors of communications and literature and with human-
istic professors of physics and economics (Klamer, for example). The 
chairs and deans hate co-teaching, as inefficient, they think. But it is vastly 
educational for everyone involved. My heroes among economists at the 
time were from the previous decades, the 1960s and 1970s, not this dec-
ade-and-a-half, 1980–1995, learning the humanities. To list some of the 
humanistic influencers: that Wayne Booth (in his brilliant Modern Dogma 
and the Rhetoric of Assent of 1974, and in his deeply humane personage). 
Richard Rorty (very shy, though). Another literary critic. Stanley Fish, of 
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Is There a text in This Class (1980), who later, astonishingly, became, at 
the University of Illinois Chicago, my dean. A colleague at Iowa, the polit-
ical theorist John Nelson, we made together the Project on Rhetoric of 
Inquiry (POROI, the acronym came from my new study of Greek), which 
prospers yet. The mainly British sociologists of science such as Harry Col-
lins (1985), Michael Mulkay (1985), Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar 
(1979). Among philosophers of science, Paul Feyerabend (1975), who 
comes as close as one can to a rhetoric of science without saying it. Of 
course, the historian of science Thomas Kuhn, the father of us all. Yet not 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) but his better book, a collec-
tion of detailed studies of the rhetoric of physics, The Essential Tension 
(1977). Tom would never admit he was doing rhetoric of science, but he 
was. Likewise, not Lakatos’ somewhat silly sociology-that-doesn’t-know-
it-is The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (in book form, 
1978) but his much better D.Phil. thesis issued in book form also only 
after his death, Proofs and Refutations (1976), which is rhetoric-that-
doesn’t-know-it-is. The great chemist (his son did win the Nobel prize in 
the field) and classical liberal Michael Polanyi (Karl Polanyi’s smarter 
brother), especially, The Tacit Dimension (1966). The philosopher Stephen 
Toulmin, with his philosophy of persuasion (1958). 
Notice that they are all men. I was still very much a guy, paying atten-
tion as guys do to other guys. After 1995, I started to have heroines, such 
as Anne Hollander (1994), Carol Gilligan (1982), Deborah Tannen (1990), 
Philippa Foot (1978), Elizabeth Anscombe (1958), Simone Weil ([1940–
1941] 1945), Simone de Beauvoir ([1949] 1953; the two Simones both 
scored higher on the final exams at the École Normale Supérieure than 
their contemporary Jean-Paul Sartre, who was eventually the [unfaithful] 
lover of one of them). 
 
Let’s dwell, for a moment, then, on your ‘Crossing’ (a ‘Midwestern 
woman from Boston who was once a man’). How did that decision in-
fluence your intellectual path and your university career? 
Calling it a ‘decision’, note, takes it out of the realm of identity and puts 
it into the realm of rational choice—which is one of the habits in economic 
science that humanomics corrects. Of course, as born women can testify, 
being a woman is not an advantage to a career in economics. Ask the 
shades of Joan Robinson, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, and Barbara Berg-
mann, in life all Nobel-worthy (McCloskey 1998). Barbara was a graduate 
student at Harvard in the mid-1950s, and she told me once of how her 
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assertive personality grated on the professors. Ten years later, ‘Donald’ 
McCloskey’s assertive personality evoked cries of delight from the same 
professors. Anyway, the transition during 1995–1997, chronicled in 
Crossing (1999), gave intellectual permission to explore queer studies, 
novels by women, feminist theory, women’s history, which were exten-
sions of range supplementary to the humanistic decade-and-a-half. 
Vernon Smith gives the advice to young economists to dig deep in one or 
another field of economics, but then read very widely outside economics, 
as he does. I dug deep into Chicago-style price theory and into economic 
history, and then read widely. 
 
We could also speak of another type of ‘crossing’, interdisciplinary. 
Your work is extremely broad and you have made major contributions 
to economic theory, history, methodology, and statistics—in this regard, 
I’m also thinking about your book with Stephen Ziliak, The Cult of Sta-
tistical Significance (2008). You have crossed, or broken through, vari-
ous disciplinary boundaries. Considering the growing hyper-specializa-
tion of knowledge, which is reflected both in the ever higher discipli-
nary walls and in the disciplinary journals, have you had difficulty pub-
lishing in certain journals in recent years?  
Oh, sure. Science is conservative, and should be. Economic science should 
not go running after every alleged novelty, such as the current madness 
for Modern Monetary Theory, or the lesser madness of obsession with 
equality when the relief of the wretched of the earth depends mainly on 
raising the mean, not reducing the variance. Some principles—Kuhn 
called them ‘normal science’, Lakatos called them ‘the core’—are perma-
nent. 𝑀𝐶 =  𝑀𝑈. 𝑀𝑉 =  𝑃𝑇. So when a mere economic historian comes 
along claiming, say, that econometrics is bankrupt in its absurd misuse 
of 𝑡 tests and 𝑅2—even if the mere economic historian relies in her claim 
on scores of the best theoretical and applied statisticians of the past cen-
tury, and now also on an official report from 2016 of the American Sta-
tistical Association (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016)—nonetheless the aver-
age journal referee in economics, grossly overtrained in that one quanti-
tative method and ignorant of all the others, is entitled to be a little skep-
tical. But anyway I do not now knock insistently on the door of refereed 
journals. I have a hundred refereed articles in my CV, which is perhaps 
sufficient to establish my scientific credibility, if such a number was rel-
evant to assessing science, which often it is not. The well-known idiocies 
of the referee system should be replaced by actually reading the article. 
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Furthermore, I have always felt that it is selfish (I can name the worst 
egotists) for a senior academic to clog up the refereed journals, especially 
the ‘top’ ones, considering that the juniors depend on a publication in the 
Journal of Political Economy or The American Economic Review to survive. 
For the rest, over the past couple of decades especially, I have been di-
recting the additions to my CV to conference volumes and invited re-
sponses and the like. Here I follow my admired colleague (though the 
Help) at Chicago, Harry Johnson (1923–1977), a great citizen of the pro-
fession, spreading his admittedly somewhat repetitive articles around to 
the lesser outlets, for their benefit, not his. 
Increasingly, too, I have ventured into journalism, especially in de-
fense of liberalism against its numerous enemies. Decades ago, I was in 
Sweden and found in a university library a bibliography of all the publi-
cations of the great Swedish economists of a century ago: Knut Wicksell 
(who well understood 𝑀𝐶 =  𝑀𝑈 and 𝑀𝑉 =  𝑃𝑇), Eli Heckscher (also an 
economic historian), Gustav Cassel, Bertil Ohlin. Startlingly, about every 
fortnight or so throughout their careers all of them dashed off a piece of 
popular journalism in aid of liberalism. Deirdre can only follow such a 
public-spirited example. 
 
And what do you think of the current obsession with rankings and ci-
tation counting of journals, scholars, and universities? 
It’s disgraceful, corrupting of science and scholarship, a lazy method in 
line with many others that people like. It’s a piece with the naïve positiv-
ism that I gradually escaped from. Reading some of her work is the only 
intelligent way to assess another scholar or scientist (actually, as a hu-
manist and as a serious student of science I don’t believe in such a dichot-
omy as ‘scholar’ and ‘scientist’, and in the talk of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ in sci-
ence; but never mind). You don’t have to read much of her work to know. 
Colleagues and chairs and deans will whine, ‘Oh, it takes so much work!’ 
But that’s silly. You know after reading ten pages of Foundations of Eco-
nomic Analysis (Samuelson [1941] 1947) or A Theory of the Consumption 
Function (Friedman 1957), not to speak of anything by Wayne Booth or 
Stanley Fish or Richard Rorty, that you are in the presence of a first-rate 
mind, to be hired or promoted, and listened to. Einstein’s CV was short 
but epoch-making. So was Ronald Coase’s. At the other end of the spec-
trum of quality, it takes a paragraph or two to come to the opposite con-
clusion. (A tip, dears: Never start an abstract with ‘This article . . .’; it’s a 
reliable signal of incompetence.) The assessing depends on one knowing 
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the field well and having mature tastes and then doing the reading, which 
after all is the point of having departments and senior academics making 
such decisions in the first place. 
Yet, in the Netherlands, each academic has in effect a number tattooed 
on her forehead giving the count of publications. In Britain, each depart-
ment has it, which results in comically cynical relocating of people with 
big CVs in advance of every research assessment exercise. As to university 
rankings, the same. No one ranking 100 universities worldwide has the 
breadth of experience to make such a judgment. True, I can tell you from 
experience that the University of Chicago has a higher percentage of first-
rate minds than does, say, the University of Illinois at Chicago. But so 
what? I can also tell you that there are idiots at the University of Chicago 
(no, I will not name them) and geniuses, such as the philosopher Samuel 
Fleischacker or again for a while that Stanley Fish, at the University of 
Illinois Chicago, and Stanley’s wife Jane Tompkins. Whether a student or 
a faculty member, go find them and make them talk to you. If you listen, 
really listen, you’ll get educated. 
And by the way, it should be your own department that does the read-
ing and then discusses seriously the product and promise of the candi-
date, not outsiders. You are going to live with her. Kenneth Arrow isn’t 
going to. Ken’s generous letters touted every successive student he had 
as the best ever, in monotone increasing series. Letters of recommenda-
tion, as I have written in The Chronicle of Higher Education (2002), are 
public opinion surveys with wretched statistical properties. In History, at 
the University of Iowa, we had the Aydelotte Rule, which was that only 
people who had actually read the book and therefore were in a position 
to assess the mind were permitted to speak or vote. You couldn’t fake it. 
Anyone who has been in a faculty meeting in Economics knows that im-
posing the Aydelotte Rule would revolutionize scientific work in the field. 
 
Another turning point and a great achievement in your intellectual 
journey is certainly the Bourgeois Era trilogy (2006, 2010, 2016b), a 
sort of Opus Magnum about the ‘Great Enrichment’. It is impossible to 
summarize the trilogy in a few words, though you recently tried to do 
so in a ‘lighter’ book (written with Art Carden), Leave Me Alone and I’ll 
Make You Rich: How the Bourgeois Deal Enriched the World (2020), 
almost a ‘pop’ version of the trilogy itself, to be read together with Why 
Liberalism Works: How True Liberal Values Produce a Freer, More 
Equal, Prosperous World for All (2019a). 
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Would it be correct to say that the discovery of liberal thought rep-
resented, considering your leftwing youth—well, even an ‘ex-Marxist’—
a real spiritual ‘conversion’? 
Yes, but not a conversion to opposites, like my conversion from agnostic 
to Christian. It was a realization that I had always been a liberal, by the 
European definition—that is, a believer that diversity of thought is essen-
tial, such as what comes from liberty of the press and from academic 
freedom, and that no truth is final except that humans should live as 
adults liberated from masters whether a husband or a Party or an ortho-
doxy in economics. A real, Party-line, Leninist like Jean-Paul Sartre be-
lieves, as Lenin himself wrote, that “from this Marxist philosophy, which 
is cast from a single piece of steel, you cannot eliminate one essential 
part, without departing from objective truth, without falling prey to bour-
geois-reactionary falsehood” (1909, 326). As I learned more about eco-
nomics and the economy and actual instead of fairy-tale economic his-
tory, I realized that I was not such a Marxist, as thrilling as it was to be 
one. The songs of the left and labor unions are great, and I sang them in 
the 1960s to guitar accompaniment with gusto. But as the old joke says, 
someone who is not a socialist at age 16 has no heart. Someone who is 
still a socialist at 26 has no brain (I adjust the ages). I realized that I actu-
ally was a boring, bourgeois nineteenth-century liberal, who sees more 
than a single piece of steel. And in my later education as a humanist, I 
realized the foolishness of the positivistic belief that there is a view from 
nowhere, in which a number or a word comes supplied with its own inter-
pretation independent of human concerns, Lenin’s objective truth. Look, 
here is a stone. Yes, God’s objectivity. Granted. But its human meaning 
can be as a projectile to throw at the Tsarist police, or as a geological 
sample, or as a decoration along the garden path. 
 
Which liberal thinkers have contributed most to your reflection? And 
how has your reflection further contributed to the development of lib-
eral ideas?  
Any American growing up in the 1950s was supplied tacitly with a host 
of liberal principles, such as disdain for Senator Joseph McCarthy’s 
Trump-like authoritarianism, but also a host of statist principles, such as 
that the US role in the world should be as an anti-Communist policeman. 
At university, in the early 1960s, I thrilled to Mill’s On Liberty, but took it 
as completed, routine, done. And I thrilled equally to Zola’s socialist-lean-
ing Germinal. Then the civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam War 
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movement, both of which I supported but didn’t do much about, shook 
my belief in the completeness of US liberalism. 
But mainly I came to liberalism through economics, learning in the 
mid-1960s from John Meyer and Alexander Gerschenkron that economic 
analysis of a liberal cast actually works as science and policy. Then I spent 
twelve years at Chicago, my first job of three. Yet the big reveal came in 
1974, half-way through Chicago, with Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Uto-
pia. I had read Rawls, and found his sweet statism mildly persuasive, 
though noting his technical deficiencies, such as assuming without evi-
dence that people behind a veil of ignorance would be ‘maximin’ in utility. 
Nozick converted me. (He himself in later books drifted away from the 
neither-left-nor-right position of true liberalism, which floats above the 
usual spectrum. He spent too much time at Harvard, I reckon.) Note that 
the influence was not the Austrian economics I later learned, from the 
late 1980s on. Though Hayek was certainly correct that “in a free society 
the general good consists principally in the facilitation of the pursuit of 
unknown individual purposes” (1976, 1), I still clung to social welfare 
functions and the like. You can read about them in my underground-clas-
sic textbook of microeconomics ([1982] 1985).4 It took me a while to get 
over Harvard and then to get over Chicago, while keeping the good bits of 
both. 
 
Since we are talking about liberalism, it seems high time to explain in 
what sense you think you are a ‘Christian classical liberal’. And I’d like 
to understand better how you see the relationship between Christianity 
and liberalism. Certainly it is an important aspect of your reflection on 
ethics and economics, virtues and economy, but I suspect it is much 
more than that. 
Yes, it is more. Last year I wrote an article for a conference mainly of 
theologians, which came out in January 2021 in a new Journal of Econom-
ics, Theology and Religion, entitled ‘The Liberty of the Will in Theology 
Permits the Liberated Markets of Liberalism’ (2021c). That about sums it 
up. (I have gotten into the habit of naming chapters and articles as declar-
ative sentences making the main point. Alexis de Tocqueville’s L’Ancien 
Régime et la Révolution ([1856] 1955) is the inspiration. I recommend the 
practice, and his book.) The opening sentence of the theology article is, 
“There is an intimate, and perhaps desirable, connection between liberty 
 
4 The textbook, The Applied Theory of Price, is available online in its entirety at www.deir-
dremccloskey.com/books/index.php. 
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of the human will under Abrahamic theology and the liberty of human 
action under liberal economic ideology” (McCloskey 2021c, 81). The argu-
ment will be elaborated, with the considerations on ethics I articulated in 
The Bourgeois Virtues (2006), in a book I am writing, God in Mammon: 
Public Theology for a Commercial Age. The book is critical of the quasi-
socialist line of Catholic social teaching and certainly of the frankly so-
cialist beliefs of many progressive Christians (progressive such as on 
other theological and social matters I myself am). 
 
I think one can also say that, in the trilogy of books, there is another 
‘trilogy’: liberty, equality, fraternity. Let’s start with liberty. Yes, you 
describe yourself as a ‘free-market economist’, but your defense of hu-
man freedom does not seem to be reducible to economic freedom, es-
pecially since you use the broader concept of human dignity in the very 
title of the second volume of the trilogy. Your idea of freedom often 
evokes the Smithian idea of independence, also understood as non-dom-
ination, if not non-slavery. It would almost seem an idea of freedom 
linked to the tradition of republicanism. Other notions of freedom have 
also been elaborated: positive and negative (I refer to the famous dis-
tinction of Isaiah Berlin [1958] 2002), or freedom under the law à la 
Hayek. Again, you often talk about freedom as creativity, which may 
perhaps be traced back to Christianity. Are these notions of freedoms 
all equally important to you, or do you think there is some hierarchy 
or even incompatibility between them? 
The tri-logy, Greek for ‘three words’, of the early French Revolution (first 
articulated in 1790 by, of all people, Robespierre) was, after all, liberal 
ideals, in the line of Locke, and Voltaire, and Smith. Liberalism is a 
throughgoing equality of permission, with the loving fraternity of a re-
public. True, the tri-logy was also in the line of the autocratic possibilities 
in Rousseau’s volonté générale, as, for example, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. And Rousseau and his evil spawn in European statism came 
from a France that already had disabilities in carrying out the liberal 
motto of 1790, in its previous lack of experience in liberty and its habit 
from Richelieu on of centralization—as Tocqueville showed in L’Ancien 
Régime. Add these together and liberty is doomed. The French tri-logy 
was immediately betrayed in the Terror, the Directorate, the Consulate, 
the Empire. But so is under threat now, obviously in Russia and China, 
but less obviously in Italy and the US. 
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Liberalism is precisely non-slavery. It overturns hierarchy ruling you 
and me, whether by aristocrat or bureaucrat. The very word ‘liberalism’ 
contains the program. ‘Liberal’ is of course from classical Latin liber, un-
derstood by the slave-holding Romans as (in the words of the Oxford Latin 
Dictionary) “possessing the social and legal status of a free man, free (as 
opp. to slave)” (Glare and Thompson [1982] 2012, 1125), and then libertas 
as “the civil status of a free man, freedom (as opp. of slavery or captivity)” 
(Glare and Thompson [1982] 2012, 1128). 
As is so often the case in English, however, there are paired words, 
the Latinate ‘liberty’ and the Germanic ‘freedom’. The two have relatively 
recently acquired significantly different connotations, and it is essential 
to distinguish them if we are not to become muddled. ‘Liberty’ retains the 
political connotation of people being non-slaves to other humans. ‘Free-
dom’ in English, though, has increasingly come to mean not being subject, 
happily, to any constraint at all, by physics or, in particular, by wages. 
Thus Franklin Roosevelt, in his Four Freedoms speech in 1941, numbered 
as third a ‘freedom from want’, and Amartya Sen wrote in 1999 of eco-
nomic ‘development as freedom’. The trouble is that we already have 
words for such lack of want, or for economic development, namely, in-
come, wealth, riches, capabilities, adequacies, economic development, 
and lack of want itself. To push together, as the modern English usage of 
‘freedom’ does, the politics-idea of non-enslavement to others (liberty) 
with the wage-idea of ability to buy things from others (income, wealth, 
capabilities) leads only to self-imposed confusion. I advise dropping en-
tirely the corrupted word ‘freedom’ and always using ‘liberty’. The liberal 
claim, to be sure, is that liberty does result in an increased ability to buy 
things—and so it has done spectacularly over the past two centuries. But 
the claim is that liberty leads to dignity, independence, positive liberty 
(that is, income, capabilities), liberty of religion, even, I would claim, the 
rule of law—notice about that last one how indignation against the King 
or President claiming to be above the law is foundational to a rule of law; 
without such indignation, Trump wins and the rule of law disintegrates: 
see the Republican Party in 2021. But for such claims to be meaningful, 
their truth needs to come from the evidence, not from a mis-definition of 
development as being freedom, simpliciter. An ideology of equality of per-
mission, considered quite absurd by the ancient hierarchy, and under at-
tack since then by special interests seeking protection or simply some 
graft, made the modern world. Not equality of outcome or opportunity. 
Permission. No tyranny. 
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Speaking of equality, the trilogy was written right during the years 
when everyone was starting to worry about growing inequalities. 
Piketty was emblematic. Among other things, you wrote a critical re-
view (2014) of his Capital in this journal. What do you think of the con-
cern, shared by many scholars, pundits, and politicians, about growing 
inequalities? 
I think my beloved colleagues are, to use the Southern US expression from 
hunting squirrels with a pack of hounds, barking up the wrong tree. The 
full case is in the Piketty review and in further comments in Why Liberal-
ism Works (2019a). But I can briefly sketch it here. For one thing, inequal-
ity has not in sober fact increased. We can agree I suppose that a non-fact 
is a poor basis for panicked policy. In only three of the countries Piketty 
studied—the USA, the UK, and Canada—did financial wealth, which is all 
he studied, become less equal. For the rest he is worrying about the fu-
ture, based on his structural ‘model’. He ignored human capital and public 
capital and social capital. Piketty aside, the inequality statistics anyway 
never change much, not on the scale of the astounding rise in the average 
since 1800, continuing today—that 3,000 percent in the Great Enrich-
ment, which any economic historian can tell you about. After all, there is 
a bottom 10 percent of any distribution whatever, so talk of ‘relative ine-
quality’ is meaningless, in the old logical positivist sense of being irrefu-
table and therefore empty. And recently, of course, world inequality, 
measured in a liberal way individual-by-individual, has dramatically 
fallen, because China and India and other poor countries have liberalized 
some in their economies and become richer.  
Science, I’ve said, deepens on starting with proper categories, which 
is a humanistic, philosophical inquiry. Then you can measure with an as-
surance that you are doing the science correctly. Measuring inequality in 
financial wealth is largely a category mistake. Further, equality of income 
is not an ethically decisive category. Why not equality of height, beauty, 
parentage, intelligence, cheerfulness, memory, creativity, ability to score 
goals in football? Only a vulgar Marxist or a Chicago-School economist 
could think that income covers it all. Are we to achieve equality of intelli-
gence by pounding mails into the heads of the embarrassingly large num-
ber of people much smarter than me until they are as stupid as I am?  
As the American economist John Bates Clark predicted in 1901: 
 
The typical laborer will increase his wages from one dollar a day to 
two, from two to four and from four to eight [which was accurate in 
real terms of per-person income down to the present, though the 
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calculation does not allow for the radically improved quality of goods 
and services since 1901]. Such gains will mean infinitely more to him 
than any possible increase of capital can mean to the rich […] this very 
change will bring with it a continual approach to equality of genuine 
comfort. (Clark [1901] 1949, 79) 
 
That is what we should focus on to achieve a better world, not envious 
and erroneous calculations of one person getting ahead of another. Using 
envy as a principle of social policy is ethically obnoxious and will stop 
growth. It’s happened repeatedly, for example in India before 1991. 
 
Modernity has awakened to the cry of ‘Liberté, égalité, fraternité’, but 
many believe that fraternity, or brotherhood (or sisterhood!), has been 
forgotten, even if some continue to associate it with the more contem-
porary ‘solidarity’. In the first book of the trilogy, Bourgeois Virtues, 
you provide a detailed account of what you call the seven bourgeois 
virtues: Love, Faith, Hope, Courage, Temperance, Prudence, and Jus-
tice. In an attempt to restore a balance between ‘Prudence Only’ and 
the other virtues, you group the other six virtues together under the 
broad label of ‘Solidarity’. Can you explain this thesis and its meaning? 
And to what extent does your idea of solidarity differ from some con-
temporary interpretations of solidarity (I am thinking, for example, of 
those who believe that the welfare state is a form of institutionalized 
solidarity)? 
I am not sure I agree that I use ‘solidarity’ this way. True, I use it 58 times 
in The Bourgeois Virtues. But half the time it is used to criticize the his-
torical fairy tale that we have lost it in the modern world, and the other 
half of the time it is used as a combined virtue of love and justice and 
faith that yields people who want a liberal society in the first place. Soli-
darity of this sort underlies the sweet claims by, say, James Buchanan or 
Martha Nussbaum that we can make a liberal constitution, though neither 
Jim nor Martha ever quite got what is missing in their programs—namely, 
raising up ethical people to begin with (McCloskey 2011). The book ana-
lyzes the seven elemental virtues, which are pagan and Christian, and only 
have bourgeois versions (consult the one-page sermon that concludes The 
Bourgeois Virtues). My central claim is that virtues, whether elemental like 
love or molecular like solidarity, are not reducible to arguments in a util-
ity function characterizing that charmless sociopath Max U. So, for exam-
ple, love of a sort is a virtue enhanced in a commercial society. Doux com-
merce, said Montesquieu. In the one-page sermon I say: 
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Beyond the pagan virtues is the Love to take care of one’s own, yes. 
But it is also a bourgeois love to care for employees and partners and 
colleagues and customers and fellow citizens, to wish well of human-
kind, to seek God, finding human and transcendent connection in the 
marketplace in 2006, and in a Scottish benevolence c. 1759. (McClos-
key 2006, 508) 
 
Sisterhood has not been forgotten, either. It has flourished in bourgeois 
society, as I have argued at length elsewhere: the bourgeoisie liberated 
slaves, but the innovism it also caused was crucial to the liberation of 
women, too (McCloskey 2000). 
You may be referring, Paolo, to the very common claim about moder-
nity that it has led to alienation, anomie, urban isolation, bowling alone, 
and all. The claim again is factually false. I wish people would get their 
historical facts right before sounding off about how awful the modern 
world is. I get tired of pointing out again and again that olden times were 
miserable. Suffice perhaps for the present to mention that wise phrase in 
the Communist Manifesto, “the idiocy of rural life”. And of course, “The 
bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more 
massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding gen-
erations together” (Marx and Engels [1848] 1978, 477). 
 
I think I phrased the question badly, because what you say is what I 
meant (but of course my interpretation of your ‘solidarity’ may be 
wrong, and of course I should re-read the first volume of the trilogy!). 
In truth, I meant to emphasize two aspects of your reflection. On the 
one hand, your having taken into due account ‘solidarity’, while the 
vast majority of scholars (regardless of their discipline or ideology), 
from the past century until today, have mainly been focusing on liberty 
and equality (or liberty versus equality), forgetting about fraternity (or 
the more secularized solidarity). On the other hand, it seemed to me 
that your account of ‘solidarity’ has its own virtue, precisely because 
many (especially on the left) complain about the loss of solidarity (in 
society), and can only see such solidarity in ‘institutionalized forms’ 
such as the welfare state (I’m thinking about Richard Titmuss’ The Gift 
Relationship and other advocates of the welfare state), while, in my 
view, the various forms of spontaneous solidarity (that is, third/volun-
tary sector organizations, cooperatives, mutual assistance associations, 
social enterprises, or, for that matter, the market) are alive and kicking. 
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They are often neglected because much of this way of thinking is 
trapped within state/market dichotomy. 
But to continue, the last book of the trilogy, Bourgeois Equality, was, 
among other things, the subject of a stimulating symposium in this 
journal, with contributions by Gaus (2016), Goldstone (2016), Baker 
(2016), Amadae (2016), and Mokyr (2016), and your final thoughts 
(McCloskey 2016c). Do you have any further (or second) thoughts to 
add to that debate, also in light of the further reflections and criticisms 
that the trilogy has continued to arouse in recent years? 
Not anything urgent. With slight revisions, I reprint my responses, mostly 
appreciative but sometimes a little sharp, in Bettering Humanomics, by 
way of defending what I claim is the ‘killer app’ of humanomics, namely, 
the demonstration that new ideas (not investment or exploitation) and 
especially the master new idea of no masters, liberalism, made us rich 
and pretty good. 
 
Let’s go back to our starting point: Bettering Humanomics. First, I would 
like to understand better what the similarities and differences are be-
tween your approach and Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson’s Humanom-
ics (2019).5 As for the similarities, for example, both you and they insist 
on a return to the ‘father’ of humanomics, Adam Smith (and with par-
ticular reference to his Theory of Moral Sentiments), and on the key 
role played by language in understanding human behavior. 
Bart Wilson coined the very word humanomics before I used it. Bart and I 
are starting an annual prize to the person who does the best work in hu-
manomics. We’ll have to give the first prize to Adam Smith! Bart, and I, 
and Vernon have the same message as Smith did, namely, that economists 
need to attend to human speech, because human speech—as, for example, 
in the chat rooms of Bart and Vernon’s experiments on groups of students 
simulating markets and economies—is scientific evidence of the first or-
der. Bart and I go further, to literary evidence, which has figured heavily 
in all my work in economics and economic history since the 1980s and 
especially since the 2000s. I write about this in Bettering Humanomics: 
 
For many years Wilson has taught with Jan Osborn (a colleague from 
the Department of English at Chapman University in California) a 
freshman course introducing economics through such texts as an Eng-
lish translation of Goethe’s Faust. 
 
5 See also Bart Wilson’s most recent book The Property Species (2020). 
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Yes, you heard that right, Faust. Early in the epic, for instance, the 
misled Doctor Faust articulates a complaint that illuminatingly vio-
lates the no-free-lunch postulate of economics or its related twenty-
shilling-note theorem. The theorem is that routine learning, picking 
up twenty-shilling notes that might perhaps have fallen on the road-
side, earns merely routine profits […].  
The Doctor whines, ‘I have neither money nor treasures. / Nor 
worldly honors of earthly pleasures.’ […] He therefore turns to magic, 
or chartist financial advisers, or econometricians, ‘That I might see 
what secret force / Hides in the world.’ And finally in vexation he 




I believe, however, that there are differences between your and their 
humanomics approach. For example, they insist a lot on the prediction 
paradigm, while you, since your first articles on the rhetoric of econom-
ics (McCloskey 1983), have denied the methodological value of this par-
adigm. Is this methodological difference due to your proximity to the 
Austrian school, which prioritizes ‘understanding’ over prediction? 
No. I know you don’t mean to start pointless quarrels, but there’s no rea-
son to start dividing humanomics up into sub-schools. It’s too small to 
indulge in the sort of infighting that one saw in the old days among Marx-
ists (see Lenin above), or indeed nowadays in some Austrian circles. The 
alleged difference you mention is not important. No sensible person dis-
agrees that prediction and explanation are both involved in science: for-
ward prediction in some physics and linguistics, backward explanation in 
all evolutionary biology and human historiography. Prediction versus ex-
planation is a non-issue, which excites economists only because they do 
not know how physics actually operates and have read no philosophy or 
history of science and can’t get Samuelson and Friedman out of their 
heads. It’s not even a useful philosophical ‘problem’. 
 
I actually agree, following the great liberal Italian economist, journal-
ist, and maker of the post-war Italian constitution, Luigi Einaudi, who 
fought for considering economics among the humanities, in an epoch 
of strong positivism and scientism. He opposes in this Vilfredo Pareto, 
who believed that he could treat ‘humans like ants’ (I believe Pareto 
 
6 For the quotes from Faust, see Goethe ([1806, 1828–1829] 1963, 95). 
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coined the expression) and, in the style of Comte, predict and control 
their behavior.  
With reference to the prediction problem, I have the impression that 
there is another important difference between your and Smith and Wil-
son’s approach. Consider the title of the first chapter of your Bettering 
Humanomics: “Humanomics and Liberty Promise Better Economic Sci-
ence” (emphasis mine). And consider your claim: 
 
Growing up requires an expanded but modest humanistic science 
that analyzes the creativity of human action in retrospect and ac-
cepts in prospect the epistemological limits on ant-like prediction 
and control. It’s the humanities in humanomics. (McCloskey  
2021a, 7). 
 
If your human creativity coincides, at least in part, with liberty, then it 
seems to me that you say very clearly that human liberty and ‘predic-
tion and control’ are at odds with each other (well, unless we like to be 
treated as ‘ants’), right? 
Well, sure, but Vernon, and Bart, and Peter Boettke, and Don Boudreaux, 
and David Boaz, and Jeffrey Tucker, and George Will, and David Brooks, 
and hundreds of others—may their tribe increase—are humane classical 
liberals. None of us is enthusiastic about top-down mastery of humans in 
aid of Comte’s hideous ambition of 1830, which charmed me as a youth, 
‘savoir pour prévoir, prévoir pour pouvoir’. I do not want to raise Meth-
odological quarrels among us liberals! We have quite enough trouble deal-
ing with the very numerous amiable statists in economics, such as Daron 
Acemoglu and Jason Furman, not to speak of the non-amiable statists, 
such as Trump and Putin. 
But you raise a deeper question, which I have recently raised with Pete 
Boettke in an exchange in the Journal of Austrian Economics (McCloskey 
2021b). It is true that mechanical models of humans, as useful as they 
sometimes are for traffic control and even for tax policy, are always sub-
ject to the indeterminacy of language or of Christian liberty of the will. A 
fancy example is Bob Lucas’ point about an inferred change in regime 
making econometric estimates misleading. Austrian economics is indeter-
minate-language and liberty-of-the-will economics, concerning always the 
veiled future—as economics always should be: ‘structural’ economics is a 
replay of the erroneous, backward-looking labor theory of value and the 
erroneous, backward-looking fixed coefficients of input-output tables, the 
double beloved, again, of my youth, before I finally grasped price theory 
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by teaching it to Chicago graduate students. I’m trying to persuade Pete 
to abandon the statism of neo-institutionalism, which denies all this. 
 
I wish now to reflect on a couple of aspects of the methodology and 
economic philosophy of your work, in general, and of Bettering Hu-
manomics, in particular. I’d call them the pars destruens and pars con-
struens of your approach. First, the two great obstacles to the realiza-
tion of a new humanomics, to which you dedicate your critical efforts 
(also in the forthcoming sister book, forthcoming(c)), are behaviorism 
and positivism. 
That’s right. They are both top-down, infantilizing, as in nudging, and in-
dustrial planning, and other anti-liberalisms. And both are indefensible 
philosophically. And both are poor guides to understanding the economy. 
 
As for the pars construens, the aspect that seems decisive to me for a 
new humanomics, as the word itself indicates, is rethinking and reartic-
ulating the connection between the famous ‘two cultures’. A gigantic 
undertaking! The humanomics project is ‘your life-long project’. You 
argue that it is necessary to distinguish between hard sciences and so-
cial sciences, and, at the same time, you insist on the claim that “the 
humanities are scientific” (McCloskey 2016a). This, of course, has to do 
with your being ‘literary and quantitative’. So, what idea of ‘science’ do 
you think is compatible with the humanities? 
The hard/soft locution in talking about science is so deep in our minds, 
as in the two-culture sociology that C. P. Snow noted in 1959, that you, 
Paolo, think I agree with it! I do not. I say explicitly that some of the hu-
manities are ‘hard’ in any sense you care to specify (the Greek aorist, for 
example), as are some social sciences (the analysis of kinship terms, for 
example), and some of biology and physics and geology are ‘soft’. Talk to 
a physicist about dark matter and dark energy, for example: all his mas-
culinist chatter about hardness will dissolve into embarrassment. 
I do believe that it is sometimes helpful, though not in some matters 
(traffic control, the law of demand), to distinguish between method in the 
physical sciences (not ‘hard’) and method in the social sciences, for two 
reasons. For one thing, as the Austrians point out, atoms and genes do 
not talk to each other. Humans do. Therefore, introspection, among other 
uniquely human techniques such as opinion surveys and historical anal-
ogy, is a perfectly legitimate method in the social sciences and the hu-
manities. For another, the human sciences entail ethics in a way that 
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chemistry and physics and biology normally do not (though consider Fritz 
Haber making poison gas; consider the atomic bomb; consider Dr. 
Mengele). The positive/normative distinction that economics inherited 
from logical positivism is sharply true at some uselessly high level of ab-
straction. But at the middle level in which human scientists actually live, 
both fact and value figure. In economics, for example, liberated bargains 
among adults have a valence. 
 
Oh, sorry, I think I phrased the question badly (again!). You go well 
beyond Snow’s distinction! (And this is also one of the reasons why I 
believe that your approach is extremely fascinating, and why I empha-
sized your being ‘literary and quantitative’.) By ‘hard’ sciences, I meant 
the positivism and scientism that is to be kept far away from social 
sciences, thus your pars destruens. 
Thinking about the future . . . Humanomics is a better economics 
and it is also ‘bettering’. What other directions will your ‘humanomics 
project’ take? What is next on your research agenda? 
My next project, on which I am furiously working, is The Prudent and 
Faithful Peasant: An Essay in Humanomics, a big book going back to my 
research in the 1970s and 1980s on English open fields and enclosures, 
1300–1800. It will come out, I hope from Cambridge University Press, 
probably early in 2023. The book supplements what I did at Chicago and 
Iowa, early in my struggle with an inchoate positivism. I told you: I am an 
economic and historical scientist and a methodologist only out of public 
spirit, which it would have been profitable not to have. But it arouses my 
indignation that economists keep on with a bankrupt positivism, behav-
iorism, and now neo-institutionalism, ‘supported’ by blackboard theo-
rems and statistical ‘significance’. A purely Maxine-U form of Deirdre 
would not have been so aroused, and would have stuck coolly to her sci-
entific last. It would probably have been a better strategy even for the 
good of economics, because people react so very badly to being told, cor-
rectly, that they are grossly misled. They say, ‘Oh, Deirdre, you are so 
critical! Therefore I can close my ears to the truth of what you say’. It 
probably would have been wiser just to exhibit the better way, and hope 
young people got it, and then have them put the science back on track. 
The other of the pair of books published this year by the University of 
Chicago Press is the more critical one, Beyond Behaviorism, Positivism, and 
Neo-Institutionalism in Economics. But I put more hope in The Prudent and 
Faithful Peasant to persuade people about humanomics. 
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To conclude, from your experience what would you recommend to 
young scholars who are starting a university career?  
Just what Vernon said: dig deep in one place, becoming a world expert on 
it (which takes about three years after the BA in most fields), so that you 
know what depth of understanding really means, but then read extremely 
widely. My father was a professor of political science. A graduate student 
who admired him and had completed the first year of the Ph.D. program 
at Harvard in Government asked for suggestions for reading over the 
summer, preparing for the second year in which one drifts towards a the-
sis topic. The student expected some suggestions of advanced readings 
in political science, perhaps in my father’s field of constitutional law. In-
stead: ‘Read these twenty great novels’. The student was startled, but he 
was a good graduate student. Harvard unfairly collects lots of them. Bad 
students substitute their own necessarily defective judgment for the pro-
fessor’s correct judgment. The good student obeyed, and became a seri-
ous scholar/scientist. 
 
And what books would you suggest they read? Or, to put it from your 
perspective: imagine you get stuck on an island and you can only 
choose five books to keep you company, what would you choose? 
That’s tough. Francis Bacon (whom in other respects I do not admire, an 
arrogant aristocrat with silly views about how science should be central-
ized, convicted in 1625, for example, of selling legal judgments to both 
sides) wrote wisely:  
 
Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to 
be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in 
parts; others to be read, but not curiously, and some few to be read 
wholly, and with diligence and attention. (Bacon [1597] 1911, 151)  
 
That is, your mother’s rule that if you start a book you should always 
finish it is quite wrong. Scientists or scholars (as I’ve said, I dispute the 
distinction) have to read and digest an incredible amount, expanding at 
2% per month. They had better, an economist notes, equalize marginal 
benefit to marginal opportunity cost. 
Let me see. I, of course, recommend that a young economist read all 
the works of that path-breaking economist D. N. McCloskey, such as the 
collections of her shorter reviews and columns in three volumes in course 
of publication by the American Institute for Economic Research (McClos-
key 2020, forthcoming(d), forthcoming(e)). A little more seriously, I do 
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recommend that every young economist, or philosopher of economics, 
read and do the problems in The Applied Theory of Price, and in the sim-
ilar price-theory texts in the Chicago tradition, starting with the elemen-
tary book by Paul Hayne, Peter Boettke, and David Prychitko, then moving 
on to Armen Alchian, Steve Landsburg, George Stigler, Milton Friedman, 
Gary Becker, and Kevin Murphy. No one is an economist until they under-
stand the theory of price. Then they can criticize it intelligently, as hu-
manomics does. If you don’t do the work, you will fall into the superficial 
criticisms one sees daily, which have no scientific or philosophical depth, 
and are regularly simply mistaken, such as hard/soft, positive/normative, 
number/words, male/female. 
And every economist should have read critically and appreciatively in 
the history of her discipline: Smith (The Theory of Moral Sentiments as 
well as The Wealth of Nations), Ricardo, Mill, Marx (you may omit volumes 
two and three), Walras, Menger, Marshall, Keynes, Mises, Hayek, Samuel-
son, Friedman. 
Beyond that, read this summer twenty great novels—never the latest 
best-seller, always something like the novels of Jane Austen or Leo Tol-
stoy that have, as the cliche has it, stood the test of time. 
 
Would you like to add something to explain one or more of the qualify-
ing adjectives you used to describe yourself and that I left aside? 
No. You’ve covered it! Though I should mention a long forthcoming auto-
biographical essay, “Apologia Pro Vita Sua: A History of My Economic 
Opinions” (forthcoming(a)). 
 
Thank you very much, Deirdre, for the time you dedicated to this inter-
view. I am deeply honored. 
The honor, carissimo, is mine! 
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